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1. Introduction
The regulation of multinational banking has received much attention re-
cently, as evidenced by the contents of an official communiqu6 issued by the
governors of the central banks in the Group of Ten countries and in Switzer-
land. Summarizing the primary concerns of official circles, the communique
acknowledged that the increase in international banking transactions has been
encouraged by differences in the regulation of national and international
banks. Furthermore, the communique noted, the uncontrolled growth of
international banking aggregates challenges concerned states to devise ap-
propriate remedies which could include (both national and international) new
or increased regulation [I].
This subject is interesting not only because of its current importance but
because it serves to illustrate the need for economic analysis as a discipline to
take into account the effects of regulation. As used in this article "regulation"
will encompass the totality of measures - incentive and restrictive - which
governments take to influence the behavior of economic institutions and to
attain pre-defined economic goals. The specific legal forms of'these measures
will not be specified; suffice it to say they are many and rely on a variety of
institutional mechanisms. Instead, emphasis will be placed on the interaction
between national economic policies and the totality of the regulatory tools used
for implementing these policies, remembering always that regulation is the
direct operative form of policy.
In this economic analysis of the effects of regulation upon multinational
banking, the existing body of rules will be examined in the context of their
economic milieu. That is to say, this analysis will seek to determine the
objectives of economic regulation (i.e. what events made it necessary and what
are its ultimate goals?) and the efficiency of the regulation (i.e. has the
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regulation attained its objectives?). In addition, this analysis will examine
secondary or indirect effects of regulation, i.e. unexpected consequences which
can be traced back to the regulation under study [2].
Multinational banking activity is an excellent subject for economic analysis,
as the discipline has just been defined, because a multinational bank is above
all merely a bank and, as such, is subjected to state regulation more often than
any other economic institution. Furthermore, since an important, if not a
major, portion of its activity occurs outside the economy of its home country,
the existence of a multinational bank is a challenge to the home country's
banking regulation system.
Banks are the most widely regulated economic institutions in all countries,
first and foremost because money is the medium par excellence of banking
activities. As far back in history as one may go, money has been both the
symbol and the prerogative of sovereignty. Whatever its form, paper or
precious metal, it has by convention always been a "good" which acquires such
value as the dominant political power chooses to ascribe to it. In modern
banking systems where the doniinant forms of money are not only paper
money but bank money created by the (commercial) banks themselves, state
control is exerted by means of a regulatory hierarchy in which commercial
banks are made dependent on the nation's central bank.
During the course of this century nations have been particularly concerned
about regulating banking activities because of the Great Crash of 1929 and
because of a trend toward increasing state intervention in economic life. In all
Western countries the memory of the Great Crash and of the succession of
bank failures which it occasioned stimulated the introduction or the re-enforce-
ment of measures which would protect depositors and thus enhance the
trustworthiness of money. Such measures, aimed at compelling banks to
exercise some managerial prudence, focused upon bankers' professional quali-
fications, the definition of banks' fields of activity, compulsory compliance
with certain balance sheet ratios, and the preservation of the competitive
structure of banking markets [3]. Since the Second World War states have been
giving increasing priority to monetary policy. As a result, no matter what
devices are utilized (e.g. action on interest rates or action on the volume of
loans), monetary policy and its correlative range of regulations have also
greatly influenced the conditions for banking activity.
These state concerns may be summarized and analyzed as two trends in
banking regulation: microeconomic and macroeconomic. In the former, the
so-called "prudential" action of the state seeks to guarantee the good health of
banks by compelling banks to adhere to sound banking standards, thereby
eliminating the greater elements of risk. In the latter, the state seeks to ensure
the good health of the economy by establishing monetary policy regulations to
which the banks must adhere.
This distinction between micro- and macroeconomic concepts and goals is
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theoretically applicable to analysis of multinational banking activity. However,
and this is precisely what makes multinational banking so interesting as a
subject for study, while multinational banking activity is not nearly so closely
regulated as is domestic banking activity, it is the multinational side of the
banks' activity that has undergone the most spectacular evolution in the last
two decades through extension of the networks of the large United States,
European, and Japanese baniks, multiplication of off-shore centers, and
skyrocketing Eurocurrency transactions. As a result of these developments, the
multinational bank, defined as a bank that operates in more than one country
and conducts activities on the Eurocurrency markets, has asserted itself as one
of the most dynamic financial institutions on the world economic scene today.
This article will examine the extent to which this evolution has been caused
or influenced by regulatory factors. First, it will study the history and theoreti-
cal underpinning of the relevant regulatory factors. Then, from a more
practical point of view, it will examine the regulatory issues raised by multina-
tional banking activity on the Eurocurrency market. The focus will remain on
issues facing authorities in Western countries collectively rather than on the
problems encountered by specific countries.
2. Effect of regulation on banks' multinational expansion
In general, it appears to be the case that the stiffer the banking regulations
in a given country, the more likely it is that the banks located there will
undertake foreign expansion [4]. Both microeconomic regulations, such as
limitations on banks' field of activities, and macroeconomic regulations, such
as limitations on capital outflows or credit growth, have this effect. These
examples are discussed below.
2.1. Observations
2.1.1. Microecononfic regulation that limits the banks' field of activities
The effects of this type of regulation will be greatest where banking
operations and systems are narrowly specialized and restricted to specific
geographic areas. The United States and Japan illustrate this.
United States banks are regulated primarily by state and federal branching
laws and by the federal Glass-Steagall Act. The branching laws prohibit banks
in one state from opening branch offices in other states and, to varying
degrees, they limit branching within states. Unit banking statutes are the most
restrictive since they simply disallow branching and only permit the opening of
auxiliary windows that accept deposits and exchange currency. Statewide
branch banking statutes are the most liberal since they permit banks to
establish branches within the state either by merger or de novo. In between
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these two extremes, the limited branch banking statutes allow branching to
occur within a relatively small geographic area.
The Glass-Steagall Act [5] regulates the banking industry by classifying
banks according to the nature of their activities. So-called commercial banks,
the type we are concerned with in this article, are permitted only to receive
deposits, make loans, and become involved in a few types of investment
activities. On the other hand, so-called investment banks are permitted only to
counsel companies in the capital market, analyze companies' financial prob-
lems, and render managerial advice to such companies.
When U.S. banks turn to foreign countries all thrse restrictions disappear.
The Federal Reserve Board freely permits the banks to establish branches
abroad because it wants to maintain U.S. bank competitiveness in foreign
markets. This practice has led to the opinion that "[in some instances foreign
branching is a reaction against state regulations prohibiting the establishment
of branch offices" [6]. Similarly, U.S. banks are permitted to conduct a greater
diversity of activities abroad than within the United States. For example, they
have been allowed (through subsidiaries and affiliates) to underwrite and deal
in securities and thus to participate in the Eurobond market and in the nascent
capital markets in some developing countries. In connection with their finan-
cial activities they have also been allowed to make limited equity investments
in non-financial companies [7]. In addition to this freedom for foreign opera-
tions, U.S. banks have added opportunities for financial diversification through
establishment of "Edge Act" or "Agreement' affiliates in the United States to
handle international business [81.
With respect to the range of permitted activities for banks, the situation in
Japan bears some resemblance to that in the United States. For instance,
Japanese banks are not permitted to deal in securities. Moreover, banks are
further specialized according to whether they engage in mainly short-term
activities (city banks) or long-term financing activities (long-term credit banks
or trust banks). Japanese banks have reacted to these limitations by progres-
sively widening their foreign operations to include operations forbidden to
them in Japan [9].
This activity abroad evolved in two stages. First, the city banks created
consortium banks with brokerage companies (e.g. Banque Europ~enne de
Tokyo established in Paris in 1968; Japan International Bank and Associated
Japanese Bank (International) established in London in 1971) in order to enter
into long-term financing in the international financial markets [10]. Subse-
quently, the banks and the brokerage companies started seeking joint expan-
sion abroad. The commercial banks, desirous of engaging in brokerage activi-
ties such as issuing and underwriting Eurobond loans or serving as consultants
for mergers and acquisitions, created common subsidiaries with British
merchant banks (e.g. Sanwa Bank with Baring Brothers, Fuji Bank with
Kleinwort Benson, Mitsui Bank with Hambros, Sumitomo Bank with White
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Weld) or with other foreign commercial banks (e.g. Dai Ichi Kangyo Bank
with Paribas) [11]. On the other hand, the Japanese brokerage companies
desirous of entering the banking business established subsidiaries in such
countries as The Netherlands, Great Britain, and France or in Hong Kong
where the subsidiaries receive the legal status of banks [12].
Thus, in the United States and Japan domestic regulations caused the banks
to look to foreign expansion so as to establish multipurpose institutions which
operate simultaneously as commercial and investment banks.
2.1.2. Macroeconomic regulation that limits capital outflows or credit growth
Once again, the effects of this type of regulation can best be understood by
examining two countries which have such regulation: the United States and
Germany.
In order to reduce its balance of payments deficit during the period 1965 to
1974, the United States limited the growth of loans for foreign financing
through the so-called Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint program (VFCR)
[13]. Quite spectacularly, the result was that foreign branches of U.S. banks
replaced their head offices for the allotment of foreign loans. In 1964, just
before the VFCR program was established, 42% of the international assets of
U.S. banks were entered on the books of their foreign branches, the rest being
held by central offices; in 1973, the share held by the foreign branches rose to
almost 90%. At the same time, the number of U.S. banks with at least one
branch abroad had risen from 11 to 129, and the total number of branches
from 181 to 737 [14].
Domestic monetary policy also contributed to this foreign branching boom
of U.S. banks. In fact, it has been said that the U.S. monetary policy had been
"perhaps a more important factor at the basis of U.S. bank branching than the
need to follow customers" [15). Two of the measures introduced to control the
growth of banking aggregates (minimum reserve requirements and levelling off
of interest rates paid on term deposits) [16] did not apply, in fact, to the
activities of foreign branches. By raising capital through foreign branches,
parent banks circumvented the minimal reserve requirements [17].
Because they were not subject to Regulation Q, foreign branches could be
highly competitive on the Eurodollar market and, therefore, attracted deposits
which provided the parent office with the liquidity that domestic monetary
policy limited. An examination of the period from 1966 to 1969 reveals that
recourse to foreign branches was almost automatic as monetary restraint in the
U.S. became more and more of a strain [18]. By the end of 1969, the loans
made by foreign branches to U.S. banks amounted to $14 billion. Thus, the
banks took advantage of the weaknesses of the credit squeeze system to
circumvent it.
In Germany, recurrent trade account surpluses, the ever-pending question
of the deutschemark revaluation and massive capital inflows presented many
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threats to domestic monetary conditions in the late sixties and early seventies.
In December 1968, the Bundesbank imposed several measures, including
minimum reserve requirements on the growth of external liabilities of German
banks.
As was the case in the United States, German banks circumvented the
control regulations by taking advantage of their imperfections.
A typical approach to circumventing these controls was that German banks would transfer loan
business vis-&-vis German residents to the books of their foreign branches. As a result, German
(non-bank) residents would incur liabilities to the foreign branches of German banks, and since
neither these foreign branches (which legally are classified as nonresidents) nor domestic nonbank
customers were subject to the minimum reserve requirements, German banks were able to
circumvent the control without any loss of business [19].
German banks established themselves abroad in great numbers. Luxemburg,
the neighboring tax-haven, naturally became their favorite center. The aggre-
gate balance sheets of Luxemburg-based branches and subsidiaries of the
major German banks rose from two billion to six billion deutschemarks from
the beginning of 1971 to the beginning of 1972; almost half of this increase
represented an increase in the number of claims on German non-bank resi-
dents [20].
Thus, as illustrated by the United States and Germany, domestic regulation
reflecting monetary policy led to foreign expansion of banks seeking to operate
without domestic restrictions.
2.2. Discussion
The various examples that have been discussed share a common factor. The
national regulatory systems, whose effect has been to stimulate multinational
expansion of banks, have a dual nature; they are much more permissive for
the banks' activities abroad than they are for their domestic operations. This
difference of treatment provides an incentive for going abroad.
Besides the differences existing within the national systems of banking
regulations (between the measures that apply to domestic activities and those
that apply to foreign operations), there are differences between the various
national systems, which also affect a bank's decision regarding multinational
expansion.
Some countries, for instance, have severely regulated the establishment of
foreign institutions on their territory (Canada, Japan, Australia) whereas
others have maintained a liberal stance by granting foreign banks overwhelm-
ing advantages [21]. Therefore, a bank wishing to establish itself outside its
country may prefer one foreign financial center to another, depending on the
extent of the bank's desire to minimize regulatory constraints [22]. It should be
noted, however, that with choice of location, the influence of regulation is felt
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in the ultimate phase of the process of multinational expansion (in deciding
where foreign offices should be opened) and not, as was the case above, in its
early stage (deciding whether there are reasons for operating from foreign
offices). Yet, in practice, this distinction loses much of its clarity.
Examination of bank transactions on the Eurocurrency markets helps to
explain what role regulatory factors really play in the decision of a bank to
undertake multinational expansion. The Eurodollar market (which represents
approximately four-fifths of all Eurocurrency business) provides an informa-
tive example. It is well known that a certain number of institutional conditions
and regulatory measures have determined the evolution of this market. Tradi-
tion has it that the first Eurodollars appeared in 1957, during the cold war
period, at a time when the fear that the United States would place an embargo
on Soviet dollar holdings caused their holders to transfer them to London
banks. The restrictions that British monetary authorities placed the same year
on the international use of the pound sterling led the London banks to develop
international lending by using the U.S. currency. In 1958, the return to
external convertibility of the major European currencies created the conditions
for the international mobility of capital.
During the sixties, the growth of Eurodollar transactions and the increase in
the number of U.S. bank branches and subsidiaries in Europe resulted from
the measures, described above, taken by the U.S. monetary authorities for
domestic credit restraint and capital outflow limitation.
While it seems that the Eurodollar market owes much of its development to
the restrictive and discriminatory measures taken by national (and mostly
U.S.) monetary authorities, is it possible to say, however, as it is often
suggested, that the Eurodollar market is "explained" by these various events,
or even that it would never have been created without them?
There is no denying that Eurocurrency transactions can be conducted only
insofar as national regulations permit. In particular, a sufficient degree of
international capital flow must exist, together with some freedom of exchange,
so that some currencies (in practice the dollar, and to a lesser extent the
deutschemark and the Swiss franc) may be held by non-residents. There is no
denying, also, that Eurocurrency transactions began to take place because of
disparities between regulations applying to domestic bank transactions and
foreign bank transactions. It is no wonder, finally, that the banks try to evade
regulations: the rise in Eurocurrency transactions illustrates the tendency of
markets to elude official control. The fact that Eurocurrency markets are
essentially unregulated [23] is their main characteristic, contrasting with
domestic banking conditions. In other words, it is impossible to ignore
regulation if we are to understand the Eurocurrency phenomenon. However,
this explanation is far from comprehensive if it is limited to an analysis of the
influence of the regulation variable. This may even conceal other, more
fundamental considerations.
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Using the example of the Eurodollar again, it is evident that the phenome-
non is non-reversible: when the VFCR program was discontinued in 1974, the
contraction of the Eurodollar market, that many had predicted, did not occur
[24]. The wave of rapid creation of U.S. branches in Europe from 1965 to 1973
was not followed by a counter-wave of the disappearance of those same
branches from 1974 onwards, as the hastiness of their appearance might have
led one to suppose. Rather, by that time, the banks had reorganized the
distribution of international loans: branches, less called upon to finance the
central offices than during the monetary restrictions of the sixties, shifted their
activities toward Eurodollar international financing more than before [25].
The fact that the Eurodollar market outlived the repeal of the measures that
had signalled its genesis is evidence that its justification goes far beyond the
circumstances of its creation. That is to say, the non-reversibility of the
Eurodollar phenomenon indicates that the process is more than the mere result
of regulatory constraints applied here and there to control the banks' activity.
To understand the phenomenon, one must look to see what world economy
functions are being fulfilled by Eurocurrency banking transactions. From this
viewpoint, the justification of these transactions becomes simple: they exist
primarily because they are useful. They present many advantages which suit
the very specific demands made upon them.
The advantages of Eurocurrency markets can be briefly summarized under
the following three headings.
(a) Scale: banking syndicates can coordinate loans of over a billion dollars
on these markets, far more than would be possible on any national capital
market.
(b)Adaptability: this results simultaneously from the almost complete ab-
sence of state controls (e.g. tax exemption and a guaranteed anonymity), the
fast completion of transactions (e.g. by telephone or telex between banks
belonging to an exclusive circle), and finally, the perfect adaptation of the
range of their services to the sophisticated needs of their multinational corpo-
rate customers (e.g. multicurrency contracts, etc.).
(c)Rates: depositors benefit from the creditor rates, which are higher than
those obtainable on national markets for the same currencies; borrowers are
also offered rates which tend to be more advantageous than those available on
national markets. The economies of scale allowed by the volume of the
markets, the absence of regulation which would press heavily on the banks'
charges, and the keen competition between banks explain the rate advantages
for both deposits and loans.
Taking such advantages into account, it is not surprising that these markets
should have become the necessary financial interchange for all the large
projects of international finance over the past few years. The primary function
of multinational banks, when they operate on the Eurocurrency markets,
consists in gathering, transforming, and redistributing liquidities on the world
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scale: the Eurocurrency markets may been considered a huge network of bank
offices covering all economic areas, through which surplus deposits made by
agents in one part of the globe are drained and then directed elsewhere
towards agents with financial shortages, by a series of successive loans and
redeposits from bank to bank and financial center to financial center (bank-
to-bank transactions). Financial Euroloans, i.e. middle- and long-term multi-
currency loans, are the tools par excellence of this function of international
financing.
This fact cannot be understood outside its general context, that of the
opening of economies, the interdependence of markets and national systems of
production, and the internationalization of the strategies of economic agents.
From this point of view, the internationalization of financial channels (and
especially the appearance, with Eurocurrency transactions, of an international
financial market) both reflects and determines the internationalization move-
ment in the commercial and industrial fields; the multinational bank is itself
the "financial counterpart" of the multinational firm [26]. Whether its financ-
ing activities are turned towards international industrial projects (participation
in syndicated Euroloans to multinational firms) or towards the financing of
disequilibria in the balances of payments (recycling oil surplus capital towards
countries with balance of payments deficits), the multinational bank matches
and supports every aspect of the movement towards economic internationaliza-
tion.
Therefore, the main justification for the existence of Eurocurrency markets
and, more generally, for the multinationalization of banks, is to be found in
the specific financial needs of an economy on its way to reaching a world
dimension.
When reconsidering the original problem, these developments shed light on
the role played by regulatory factors in the expansion of the banks' multina-
tional activity. Such multinational activity cannot be viewed merely as the
result of a wish to escape a too constraining body of regulation. Rather, to find
the essential reason for the banks' creation of foreign branches and subsidiaries
as well as the true justification for Eurocurrency markets, it is necessary to
refer to larger economic trends: the expansion of world trade in goods and
direct investment by multinational firms. Some will say that had the Eurocur-
rency markets not existed, they should have been invented. This kind of
statement does more than pay homage to the economic role of Euromarkets. It
reveals that the true causes for their existence lie in the flows of capital
transfers in the economic society - in this case, the demand for the financial
services of a world economy in the making - and not in institutional or
regulatory history. In light of these circumstances, the influence of regulatory
factors appears to exert itself on the form of multinational expansion, on its
rhythm, its extent, and its direction, but not on its very essence.
Quite probably, if the obstacles created in some countries by way of
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regulation had not existed, or had taken other forms, the geography of
international banking flows, or the map of international banking centers.
would have been different. Just as probably, the chronology of the develop-
ment of international banking would have been altered too. But this develop-
ment would not have been greatly affected. Regulatory factors act as cata-
lyzers; they can encourage the appearance of multinational banking, but
cannot essentially create the phenomenon. Perhaps they even conceal its true
nature [27].
3. The regulatory challenge of multinational banking: Should the Eurocurrency
market be subject to control?
As in the above analysis, the Eurocurrency market provides a context for
examination of the question whether regulations should be enacted to control
multinational banking. The current debate on this point is receiving consider-
able attention among official circles at the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), where the bank-monitoring agencies of the Group of Ten countries and
of Switzerland have top civil servants as permanent representatives while the
central bankers of their countries hold regular meetings in Basle to discuss
their points of view. Although the debate on the control of Eurocurrency
markets has not reached a conclusion yet, it has shed light on the main data
and issues being considered. The discussion of this issue requires both an
analysis of the arguments in favor of regulation of the Eurocurrency markets
and an exposition of what has actually been undertaken. These are discussed
below.
3.1. Arguments in support of regulation of Eurocurrency transactions
The distinction between micro- and macroeconomic concepts applies to
arguments supporting regulation of Eurocurrency banking.
3.1.1. The microeconomic arguments
The specific risks of Eurocurrency business are generally advanced to
demonstrate the need for prudential regulation.
These risks result from the original pattern of the "Eurocurrency system", in
which the banks are interrelated to a very large extent. The extent of this
interrelationship is reflected in the fact that most Eurocurrency transactions
are bank-to-bank transactions. This means that there is a high proportion of
double counting which should be netted out when the net size of the Eurocur-
rency market is calculated from the gross size estimate. In fact, bank-to-bank
transactions represent roughly two-thirds of the total number of Eurocurrency
transactions.
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Indeed, such a high degree of integration is beneficial, in that it improves
the multinational banks' efficiency in collecting and redistributing capital on
the world scale. The "interbank chain" is the series of links through which
banks balance the money surpluses of one geographic area with the borrowing
needs of another. The great importance of bank-to-bank transactions reflects
the fact that liquidities are shifted from one bank balance sheet to another, and
from one financial center to another, to achieve optimal capital allocation on
the world scene.
However necessary it may be, this interrelationship of banks entails some
risks. The banks that hold a relay position between other banks in the
international process of capital flow do not know the original source and the
final use of the money they handle. Such a situation may prevent a sound
appraisal of the risks involved. There is also a danger that disequilibria may be
passed from bank to bank in a chain reaction, if an accident (important losses
or even bank failure) happened to appear at one point in the system. In view of
this possibility, commentators have often compared the Eurocurrency system
to a "paper pyramid" [28].
Specifically, the events which would be likely to start off such a chain
reaction could result from the following risks:
* rate-related risk: because of extreme fluctuations in interest rates, banks
might be compelled to borrow funds at rates higher than their lending rates;
* maturity-related risk: a bank may finance medium- or long-term Eurocre-
dits with short-term resources;
* liquidity risk: a bank may find it difficult to raise on the market the funds
necessary for the revolving foreign currency loans it has undertaken to
make;
* the risk of failure to repay: lending banks which are owed large sums by
developing countries with uncertain abilities to repay (such as Zaire, Peru,
North Korea, etc.) face country risks;
* exchange risk: as banks doing Eurocurrency business operate on the foreign
exchange markets on a regular basis, they may suffer foreign exchange
losses.
The unsettled state of the international economic environment through the
seventies (floating currencies, steep increases in oil prices, recessionary trends),
as well as the narrowing margin of bank rates caused by very sharp competi-
tion, have intensified these various risks. The banks have tried to cope with this
situation by including special clauses in their loan contracts (e.g. clauses for
periodic revision of debtor rates, market "drying out" clauses) or by a wider
use of syndicated Eurocredits, which allow risk-sharing. Moreover, national
authorities have tended to restrain open exchange positions.
The international financing system remains unstable, however, as was
demonstrated in 1974 by the serious difficulties banks encountered with
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respect to exchange losses. Now, it is feared that the failure to repay some
over-indebted state borrower might provoke a financial crisis. It is because
those risks are now almost unanimously recognized that the question of
prudential control of Eurocurrency multinational banking is raised more
systematically than in the past.
3.1.2. The macroeconomic arguments
The argument for macroeconomic regulation of Eurocurrency markets is
based on the notions that the Eurocurrency markets (a) interfere with national
monetary policies and (b) add to world inflation.
The argument that the Eurocurrency markets interfere with national mone-
tary policies is most valid for the United States and Germany. When a policy
of monetary restraint is implemented in either of these countries, it may be
thwarted, as was seen earlier, because residents can obtain on the Euromarkets
the financial resources that are restricted domestically. Such circumvention is
possible because capital flows are not limited, in principle, in the United States
and in Germany and because U.S. and German currencies are held in great
quantities by non-resident banks, from which they can easily be borrowed.
The validity of the second notion, that the Eurocurrency markets have
inflationary effects, has not been determined. Besides the disagreement among
economists over the existence and scope of a Eurocurrency multiplier, the
professionals (bankers, legislators) also differ as to the role Eurocurrency
transactions play in the continuous rise in prices.
It is not disputed, however, that Eurocurrency supply grows at the rate of
20-25% a year, which represents a far steeper rate of increase than that in the
various national monetary aggregates. It has also been established that many
states borrow under Eurocredits, which they use to finance their balance of
payments deficits. This enables them to postpone the deeper actions necessary
to reorganize their domestic financial situations.
Although these arguments tend to show the inflationary character of Euro-
currency banking, it is often pointed out that the rapid growth of Eurocurrency
supply has no significance in itself. Rather, one must analyze the use of
Eurocredits, not their rhythm of allocation. This is because when Eurocurrency
loans contribute to increasing industrial productivity, they do not necessarily
generate inflation. It has also been said that the banks' recycling of OPEC
surpluses has had an "anti-deflationary, not an inflationary effect" [29] by
allowing oil-importing countries to pay their energy bills without cuts in their
real resouces. Finally, it can be argued that, if an inflationary effect exists, it
should be ascribed to international financing as a whole, and not to Eurocur-
rency financing alone. Indeed, one commentator has stated that "there is a
choice of two things: either foreign capital inflows are useful, and the fact they
are channeled through Euromarkets is of secondary importance; or else they
are harmful, and in this case, general restrictive measures must be devised that
should be applicable to all capital inflows from whatever source" [30].
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3.1.3. Discussion
As long as the real impact of Eurocurrency banking on inflation rates is not
quantified, it is doubtless difficult to decide whether the micro- or the
macroeconomic arguments are more persuasive. However, it is not absolutely
necessary to believe in the inflationary effect of Euromarkets to support the
idea of a macroeconomic control of these markets. At a time when supervision
of monetary supply has gained great importance in Western countries, Euro-
currency business, the fastest growing category of transactions, paradoxically
remains to a very large extent outside the scope of this monitoring. Although
the principle of extending monetary control to Eurocurrency banking seems a
logical part of an irreversible trend, there are many grounds for disagreement
as to its application.
Before looking at the application of monetary controls to the Euromarket, it
is important to note that there is a fundamental ambiguity in the very idea of
regulation of Eurocurrency transactions. Indeed, the question arises whether,
by their nature, Eurocurrency transactions are compatible with the idea of
regulation. It will be recalled that, originally, Eurocurrency business took
advantage of the regulatory disequilibrium between domestic and foreign bank
transactions, the latter being subjected to little or no regulation. This situation
can be briefly summarized by saying that the difference between a dollar and a
Eurodollar is that the latter is unregulated. The permissiveness of national
banking regulations concerning Eurocurrency transactions made their develop-
ment possible, but it does not explain the essence of Eurocurrency transac-
tions, as was demonstrated earlier.
Thus, it seems possible that the effort to submit Eurobanking to the same
regulations as domestic banking might destroy the uniqueness of the
Euromarkets by removing one of their essential advantages over domestic
markets. By following this line of reasoning to its ultimate consequence, one
might conclude that there is a danger of provoking an eventual disappearance
of Euromarkets.
Obviously, these prospects should be avoided, because Euromarkets have
attained a leading role in international financial mechanisms, and also because
no alternative can be found within the framework of any national market. In
particular, nations would be ill-advised to alter drastically a mechanism which
allows them to make up their foreign payments deficits easily. However, the
questions raised above illustrate the dilemma of regulation of Eurocurrency
markets; regulation is desirable, but it must not be applied in such a way as to
destroy the dynamics of the markets. This dilemma is solved in practice
because monetary regulatory constraints, similar to those applied to domestic
money markets, are rejected and prudential regulation, which is less ambitious
in scope, receives priority.
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3.2. Attempts to establish regulation of Eurocurrency banking
Contrary to what is generally said, it is not absolutely true that Eurocur-
rency transactions are unregulated. Some prudential measures - regulation, or
simply monitoring - have already been taken in various countries. However,
no macroeconomic regulation exists yet. The establishment of such regulation
would be a dramatic innovation, whereas the establishment of prudential
regulations would result from the generalized and coordinated application of
as yet undeveloped initiatives in a number of countries. As shall be seen, the
obstacles to be overcome differ according to the goals of the regulation.
Two preliminary observations must be made before discussing the establish-
ment of Euromarket regulation. First, attempts to establish regulation are
made through the coordination of national regulatory authorities. The coun-
tries concerned try to reach an agreement, by consensus, on the objectives and
the means to be used, each country being responsible for carrying them into
effect with respect to the banks within its jurisdiction [31]. As no nation is
willing to surrender part of its soyereignty to a kind of "central bank of central
banks", no attention has been seriously devoted to the notion of international
control effected by a supranational body endowed with adequate powers.
The second observation concerns the geographic application of the regula-
tory measures being considered. To be effective, regulation must be enforced
by all the countries where banks doing Eurobusiness are domiciled. Should this
not be the case, the countries that decide to regulate Eurocurrency business
would see their efforts thwarted by the presence of safe havens in other
financial centers which would attract transactions seeking to avoid the control
''penalty".
3.2.1. The establishment of macroeconomic control: 4 controversial initiative
It should be remembered that the macroeconomic approach to Euromarket
regulation is based on the idea that these markets are growing too fast. In
conformity with the monetarist tradition, the theory of macroeconomic regula-
tion is founded on the notion that a standard of growth should be imposed
upon all monetary aggregates. A widely held idea of dubious theoretical
justification states that Eurocurrency liabilities should increase at the same
pace as domestic liabilities. To achieve the "domestication" of the foreign
component of each nation's monetary supply, it was therefore only natural to
apply to it the regulatory devices which aimed at limiting the growth of the
domestic component.
To stem the increase in volume of Eurocurrencies, regulatory action may
bear - at least in theory - either (1) on "the source" of Eurocurrencies, by
affecting the appearance or creation of Eurocurrencies, or (2) on the banks' use
of Eurocurrencies, by exercising a moderating effect on credit allocation.
To analyze the first kind of intervention, it is necessary to describe briefly
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the mechanism of Eurocurrency creation, using the Eurodollar as an example.
Every time an economic agent transfers dollar holdings to a bank domiciled
outside the United States, there is, by definition, a creation of Eurodollars. In
the credit-expansion process, which may be triggered afterwards, the Eurodol-
lars are called primary because they feed the process in its original stage. They
are distinguished from induced Eurodollars, which result from the redeposit,
with Eurobanks, of a fraction of distributed Eurodollars. The goal of the first
type of regulation is to deal with the problem at its origin, by intervening in the
conversion of dollars into Eurodollars (and more generally, the conversion of
currencies into Eurocurrencies), that is, by acting on the creation of primary
Eurodollars.
To achieve this one first might resort to foreign exchange control. By
restricting capital outflows, foreign exchange controls limit the currency hold-
ings in the hands of non-residents, which is the very basis of Eurocurrency
creation. The efficiency of this measure is undisputed, yet its application is
very sensitive. Limiting the volume of Eurocurrencies through exchange con-
trols would affect the dollar, and to a lesser extent the deutschemark, but these
two currencies, in addition to being the preferred media of Eurobusiness, are
used for the settlement of most international transactions. Therefore, an
attempt to limit the holding of these currencies by non-residents might
obstruct the normal flow of exchanges between nations, and, in particular,
further disturb international trade relations. Moreover, it would run counter to
the trend towards greater freedom in international capital flows, which has
been developing since the end of the Second World War. It is not surprising,
therefore, that this solution has not been given serious thought.
Another solution aims at reducing the direct participation of central banks
in Eurocurrency creation by curtailing their investments of currency reserves
on the Eurocurrency markets. Instead of Eurocurrency investments, the central
banks could choose other forms of investment, and set the example. The
central banks of the Group of Ten countries and of Switzerland led the way in
1971, when they decided to discontinue the investment of their exchange
reserves on the Euromarkets. They reaffirmed this determination at the end of
1978. Such a measure has been termed "symbolic", however, for the central
banks that have adopted it hold Eurocurrency reserves amounting to about 10
billion dollars, whereas the Eurocurrency reserves of the central banks which
do not apply it amount to approximately 100 billion dollars [32]. Thus, this is
not an effective method for limiting the growth of Eurocurrency transactions.
The second kind of intervention attempts to restrain the growth of Eurocur-
rency transactions by limiting the banks' relending capacity. The measure that
obviously comes to mind in this respect is the proposal advanced by the
United States in May 1979 for minimum reserve requirements on the banks'
Eurocurrency liabilities. This proposal, which has since been rejected by most
countries, would have required the banks to counterbalance their Eurocurrency
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liabilities by unremunerated deposits with the central bank of the country of
the currency concerned. Quite simply, the point was to apply to Eurocurrency
banking liabilities a method of control which had demonstrated its worth
within the U.S. economic system.
According to its advocates - the United States and Germany - such a
regulation would have been effective in two ways. On one hand, the banks,
whose liquidities would have been reduced because of the minimum reserve
requirements, would have had a limited capacity to make Euroloans. On the
other hand, this measure would have introduced additional banking costs and
reduced the comparative advantage of Eurocurrency markets over national
money markets, thus causing Euroloans to become less attractive.
This second point stirred the most resolute opposition to the U.S. proposal.
First, countries such as Great Britain and Switzerland, which derive important
revenues from their role as international financial centers, very soon realized
the threat to their economies posed by a regulation which would only lead to a
reduction in Eurobusiness. Also, many people voiced the fear that the mini-
mum reserve requirements would deal a very severe blow to Euromarkets, a
result to be avoided for reasois already mentioned.
Finally, the decisive argument was that, were the measure to be applied, it
would only be enforced by the countries which abide by international agree-
ments on these questions. Consequently, the market would shift to unrestricted
financial centers. This argument may also be used against other regulatory
proposals under study, such as a proposal, which has prudential as well as
macroeconomic origins, to limit the volume of Euroloans to a multiple of the
banks' capital stock.
3.2.2. The gradual establishment of microeconomic control, i.e. prudential supervi-
sion
Although there are divergent opinions among nations on the necessity for
macroeconomic control of Euromarkets, there is agreement on the advisability
of prudential action. This is where reflection has been carried furthest and
where the main results have been obtained. This situation puts the focus on
supervision rather than regulation of Eurocurrency banking. After rejection of
the proposals for macroeconomic control, cooperating states are now turning
to the search for a tighter official monitoring of international banking and, in
particular, for a better assessment of related risks. Less spectacular though they
be, prudential initiatives are still held, by nations such as Great Britain and
Switzerland, to be more advisable for the control of Eurocurrency transactions
than macroeconomic regulation.
Concern with the need for prudence has predominated since 1974, when for
the first time the international banking community faced the problem of the
recycling of massive OPEC surpluses. The task was so huge that many doubted
whether the international banking system would be able to cope with it without
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damage to the economy. The result of this concern was an effort to ensure safe
banking transactions.
Since 1974, The Standing Committee on Banking Regulations and Super-
visory Practices (the so-called "Cooke Committee" at the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements) has been the forum for discussion of, and cooperation on,
banking prudence. In order to prevent the situation where a foreign branch or
affiliate of a bank might evade supervision through a reciprocal renunciation
of jurisdiction by the authorities of both the home and host countries, it has
been decided that the solvency of the banking corporation's activities should
fall under the overall responsibility of the competent agency of the country
where the parent bank is domiciled [33]. In view of this responsibility, each
central bank must have a comprehensive command of the data on the total
amount of foreign and domestic banking in the nation. In this connection, the
countries, almost unanimously, agree on the need to generalize the use of
consolidated balance sheets which treat the parent bank, its branches and
affiliates as one financial institution. Some progress has already been made in
this direction. Although balance sheet consolidation is not yet a general
accounting practice in France and Germany, it has been instituted in The
Netherlands. Since 1977, Switzerland has required that banks give consolidated
information to the supervisory boards, but publication of consolidated data is
not compulsory. In these countries the obligation to observe a ratio between
capital stock and domestic transactions has an expanded effect through
consolidated balance sheets.
The second most discussed issue of banking prudence is that a better
assessment of bank lending to so-called risk countries is necessary. The
collection of data on international banking has been broadened recently to
include this kind of information. Since June 1974, the Bank for International
Settlements requires that reporting area banks provide a country-by-country
breakdown, for all currencies together, of their foreign assets and liabilities.
Since the end of 1977, banks also communicate the breakdown according to
dates of maturity of their foreign lending to countries that do not belong to the
reporting area. These measures should ensure detailed knowledge of country
risks, which have appeared so dangerous these past few years, as was seen
before.
Although there is no cooperation in this field as yet, joint reflection has
resulted in a general awareness which bas already given rise to precise
guidelines in a few countries. At the end of 1978, the three U.S. bodies that
supervise banking transactions adopted a uniform procedure for the examina-
tion and evaluation of country risks faced by U.S. banks lending on the
international market. These bodies are also commissioned to encourage banks
to diversify their lending to sovereign customers. In Germany, at the beginning
of October 1980, the Bundesbank required banks to provide detailed state-
ments of loans made by their parent banks and by the foreign affiliates to
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twelve specific developing countries whose indebtedness was deemed high.
From these measures as a whole we can expect that international banking
will be made less secretive and that the authorities' monitoring should be all
the easier. This concern for a better supervision, and the beginning of its
implementation, can be ascribed to cooperation between central banks. With
regard to the initial goals - possible regulation of the growth of Eurobanking -
this result may seem limited. Its importance should not be underestimated,
though. The larger objective of regulating Euromarkets for macroeconomic
reasons did not materialize because, besides the technical difficulties involved,
the various nations proved that they did not have the same needs with respect
to regulation. Given their disagreement regarding the advantages and disad-
vantages of Eurocurrency banking, a majority of the relevant leading econo-
mies have decided to renounce the mandatory rule implied by a macroeco-
nomically-inspired regulation. Cooperation on the prudential issues raised by
the recent developments in multinational banking, and the subsequent aware-
ness this cooperation has produced, are less spectacular, no doubt, but it is
probably the most efficient means of achieving an adequate regulatory
response.
4. Conclusion
In the course of this article the analysis of multinational banking has
involved national economic regulations in two different ways. On the one
hand, it appeared that national regulatory systems affect the process of
multinational expansion of banks even though this phenomenon cannot be
accounted for solely by regulatory influence. On the other hand, it appeared
that the development of multinational banking, and especially the growth of
Eurocurrency transactions, calls for regulatory action by the states. Faced with
the international expansion of bank structures, and the emergence of interna-
tional money markets, the states have understood that their only course is to
take international action. This has taken the form of international cooperation.
Analyzing the world economic problems of the seventies as a whole, the
MacCracken report recently explained that "[tio a significant extent the
difficulties of the last five years can be attributed to the fact that while the
economies of the developed and developing world have become so highly
synchronised and inter-dependent, the responsibility for economic policy re-
mains firmly in the hands of independent national entities" [34]. Recent
developments have shown that multinational banking is one field where
national entities have undertaken together to give their intervention the ap-
propriate form for this advanced stage of economic internationalization.
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